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9.1 Introduction 
The diffusion of innovations is at the core of the pattern of technological 
change. Many attempts to explain and describe this process have been un-
dertaken during the last decade and a vast bibliography of publications on 
this subject is presented in Rogers, 1962 and 1983; and Rogers and Shoe-
maker, 1971. The theory of innovation is an important part of economic and 
social science, and is both conceptual and formal. Their unity is a necessary 
premise for the success of any scientific theory. 
Currently, researchers are aware of some mismatch between the con-
ceptual and formal sides of innovation theory. The conceptual part draws 
increasing attention to the hidden mechanisms of technological change. The 
problems of uncertainty and unevenness of innovations are at the center 
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of current conceptual discussions. Economists argue about the relation-
ships between ruptures and continuity in long-term technological change, 
and instability and consistency of technological trajectories during the dif-
ferent phases of an innovation's life cycle. A classification of innovations 
and some important new concepts, which reflect the technological pattern of 
change [technological and techno-economic paradigms, technological trajec-
tories (Dosi, 1984; Perez, 1983; Freeman, 1987), radical, basic, incremental, 
process, and product innovations, having different diffusion regularities] were 
recently introduced into economic theory. These conceptual innovations have 
not yet been adopted by the formal side of innovation theory. 
The majority of the present mathematical models treat the diffusion of 
innovations in a traditional way as a deterministic process, which can be de-
scribed by means of differential equations or logistic curves. This approach 
has been quite successful as many studies have shown. Without question-
ing the usefulness of this approach, we must emphasize that the hypothesis 
about the deterministic character of innovation diffusion is appropriate only 
for the growth and maturity phases of the innovation life cycle under stable 
conditions. In this chapter we present another approach to innovation diffu-
sion modeling which considers uncertainty and random fluctuations within 
the process. We consider a simple model that enables us to trace the in-
fluence of innovators and imitators on the final market share. It is worth 
mentioning that this approach for describing competing technologies, based 
on the generalized urn scheme, was proposed by Brian Arthur (1983). 
We concentrate our analysis here on the early stage of innovation dif-
fusion, when the costs and benefits of a new technology are not clear and 
the trajectory is fluctuating. This phase is not considered by the traditional 
deterministic approach because of the uncertainty and instability. 
The early phases of radical innovation diffusion are characterized by the 
two important features which are often missed in diffusion models: (1) the 
instability of the present development and the uncertainty of the future evo-
lution trajectory, and (2) the existence of different alternative technologies, 
which compete for the potential adopters. The random fluctuations play an 
important role in this phase and must be taken into consideration. 
9.2 Formulation of the Problem 
According to the Schumpeterian theory of innovation, innovation diffusion is 
a process of cumulative growth of imi.tators, which introduces the innovation 
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into the market (after its exposure by entrepreneurs) with expectations of 
high profits (Schumpeter, 1939). We assume that several alternative (from 
the point of view of their expected profitability and possibilities for adop-
tion) technologies were simultaneously introduced into the market by various 
entrepreneurs. The relative advantages of these technologies are not clear 
for the imitators, who must make their choice in order to survive in the 
changing economic environment. 
For the sake of simplicity, we consider two new technologies (say, A and 
B), introduced into the market by a corresponding number of innovators. 
The difference between our approach and the traditional approach con-
cerning the classification of the participants of the diffusion process is ap-
parent. According to the latter, all of the participants can be divided into 
the following groups: innovators, early adopters, early majority, later major-
ity, and laggards. All groups except the first are considered to be imitators 
(Rogers, 1983; Bass, 1980). The difference between innovators and imitators 
is based on the characteristic features of their behavior, "imitators unlike in-
novators are influenced in the timing of adoption by the decisions of other 
members of the social system" (Bass, 1980). From our point of view, we 
aggregate these groups into two wider ones. 
Starting with nA A-technology innovators and nB B-technology innova-
tors we study how technologies are shared by the imitators in the market. 
We assume that for each time instant t 2: lone new imitator appears on 
the market (we consider a time scale connected with the appearance of new 
firms in the market). Technology A is chosen with probability pte Xt) and 
technology B with probability 1- Pt(Xt). Here Xt is the proportion (relative 
concentration) of the adopters that use technology A at time t: 
nA _ t 
Xt - A B' 
nt + nt 
where nf is the number of adopters that use technology A at time t and 
nf is the number of adopters that use technology B at time t 2: 1. The 
probabilities of technological choice are considered to be a function of the 
relative concentration of the alternative technologies in the market. Accord-
ing to the premises of the model we assumed that the number (and share) 
of adopters of this or that technology is the indicator of the accumulated 
experience of its utilization. Also Pt is a function which maps R(O, 1) on 
[0,1], where R(O, 1) is the set of rational numbers from the interval (0,1). 
As far as nf + nf = nA + nB + t - 1 and nf = (nA + nB + t - l)Xt our 
probability of additions of new adopters depends on both the total number 
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of units of the technologies in the market nt + nf at time t and the number 
of the adopters that use technology A (nt) and technology B (np). 
We are interested in finding the final ratio of the adopters that use tech-
nology A and technology B under the assumption that the market has an 
infinite capacity. Formally speaking we shall study the limit behavior of the 
value Xt as t -+ 00. 
Let us consider f3n (x), n ~ 1, x E R( 0, 1), independent with respect to n 
random values which have Bernoulli distributions. Assume that 
P{f3t(X) = 1} = Pt(x). 
Then the process Xt, t ~ 1, follows the dynamics (Arthur et al., 1987): 
1 
= Xt + {f3t(Xt) - Xt} = Xt + 
nA + nB + t 
1 1 
+ + + t{Pt(Xt) - Xt} + + + tZt(Xt), 
nA nB nA nB 
nA 
t ~ 1,Xl = ---
nA +nB 
(9.1) 
Consequently our process is driven on average by the term Pt(Xt) - Xt (at 
time t). 
The study of the asymptotic behavior of the process Xt, t ~ 1, may be 
done by means of the methods shown by Arthur et al. (1987 and 1988), but 
we will not consider it in detail. Here we are interested in the formation 
of probabilities Pt under different premises. We shall study the asymptotic 
behavior of the innovation diffusion process according to the different prob-
ability functions, inferred from the conceptual premises. 
As was mentioned above participants of the real innovation diffusion pro-
cess usually do not have sufficient information about the relative advantages 
of new technologies. According to the premises of the model, imitators when 
making their decisions, take into account the experience of earlier adopters. 
The information about this experience is not easily obtained because it is 
related to the competitive position of adopters (firms) in the market. As 
usual each firm can be acquainted with the experience of a limited sample, 
which is far less than the whole range. This is the main source of uncertainty 
in decision making and innovation diffusion that must be taken into consid-
eration in a market economy. It can be eliminated only by accumulating 
experience about innovation adoption. But with decreasing uncert.ainty in 
the utilization of a new technology and the risk associated with its adoption, 
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the profitability also decreases with the saturation of the market during in-
novation diffusion. The supernormal profitability of a successful innovation 
is temporal - it declines with the market shift towards a new equilibrium 
level while innovation diffuses according to well-known empirical laws. 
We shall take into account both of the above-mentioned points. First, 
we shall consider the case of new technology uncertainty where imitators 
have no means to compare the expected profit abilities of the competing 
technologies, accompanied by information uncertainty about the real mar-
ket situation (this case is typical of the early stages of radical innovation 
diffusion and for technological change during the turbulent phase of techno-
logical paradigm substitution). Second, we shall consider the case in which 
imitators have enough information to compare the expected profitability of 
competitive technologies, but they still do not have sufficient information 
about the market (it is typical for the growth phases of innovation diffusion 
and technological change within a consistent technological trajectory). 
9.3 Diffusion of Innovations with Uncertain 
Probabilities (Imitative Behavior) 
According to the above-described premises of the model, imitators make 
decisions to introduce a new technology according to the accumulated expe-
rience of its utilization by previous adopters. This is a traditional assump-
tion made for diffusion innovation models (see Rogers, 1983). It is natural to 
suppose that among alternative, uncertain new technologies they will choose 
those ~hat were successfully introduced by the majority of previous adopters 
from the known sample. In the case of two technologies this decision-making 
principle can be formulated strictly in the following way: 
Rule 1. Ask an odd number r of the users of alternative technologies. If the 
majority of them use A, choose A. Otherwise choose B. 
The probability of choosing technology A at time t under the above rule 
of decision making is given by the following formula: 
r 
L 
Here C: = p!(qq~p)! is the number of combinations from q to p. Also 
q! = q(q - 1) ... 1. Let us designate this probability p[(Xt), where Xt is 
236 Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior 
the proportion of technology A in the market. Then pl(x) equals to pI(x) 
with the accuracy of the order 0(1) as t --+ 00 (uniformly with respect to 
x E [0,1]). Here 
r 
pI(x) = L C:xk(1- xr-k. 
k=~ 
When r = 1 we have p~(x) = pI(x) = x for all n ~ 1. The graphics of the 
function pI for different r are given in Figure 9.1. The function f whose 
zeros determine all possible limits for values of Xt (see Arthur et al., 1987) 
is given now by the following formula: 
Let us consider the case when r > 1. The corresponding set BJ ([0,1]) of the 
zeros consists of three points: 0, 1, 1. It may be shown that both 0 and 1 
are attainable, but 1 is unattainable (see Arthur et al., 1988). Consequently 
Xt converges as t --+ 00 to 0 or to 1 (and to both points with positive prob-
ability). This means that finally we shall have only one of the alternative 
technologies in the market. But each of them has the probability of being 
the winner. 
Let us study the relationship of the probability of being the winner 
PnA,nB (1) (starting with nA innovators of A and nB innovators of B) of 
technology A to the proportion of initial adopters. Then 
PnA,nB(O) + PnA,nB (1) = 1. 
As far as p~(x) = 1- p~(1- x), we have that 
PnA,nB(O) = PnB,nA(l) 
and 
PnA,nB(l) = PnB,nA(O). 
With equality (9.2) we obtain 
PnA,nB(O) + PnB,nA(O) = 1 
and 
(9.2) 
(9.3) 
(9.4) 
s. Yu. Glaziev and Yu.M. Kaniovski 
1 ....... . .. .. ..... ... . .................... / .• -.- ,. 
o 
/ 
./ 
./ 
I 
I 
. . 
/ 
I 
/. 
.~ r/(r' > r) 
1 
"2" 
237 
1 x 
Figure 9.1. Probability of choosing (according to Rule 1) technology A as 
a function of its market proportion. 
Combining equalities (9.3) and (9.4) with nA = nB = n one has 
Pn,n(O) = Pn,n(l) = ~. (9.5) 
Let nA < nB. Then all trajectories Xt, t ~ 1, that lead to 1 should at 
least once exceed the value ~. Let us show that the process Xt, t ~ 1, takes 
this value. Indeed, suppose that for some k, m(l ~ k < m) there will be 
kim < 1 and .ll.!.. > 1 2 m+l 2 (9.6) 
(this means that the process does not take this value). If m is an odd number, 
i.e., m = 2p + 1 for some P ~ 1, then the smallest k that ensures the second 
one of the inequalities (9.6) is k = P + 1. So we have 
kim = 2~~11 > ~, 
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what contradicts inequalities (9.6). Similarly we obtain a contradiction in 
(9.6) when m is an even number. Consequently one of the inequalities (9.6) 
is indeed an equality. It means that the process Xt, t ~ 1, when crossing the 
middle of the segment [0,1] takes the value!. Taking into account the above 
and (9.5) we obtain 
(9.7) 
As far as 
PnA,nB{ Xt < !,t ~ I} = 1- InA,nB 
and 
we have that InA,nB < 1. Consequently [because of (9.7)] PnA,nB(1) < ! and 
[because of (9.2)] PnA,nB(O) > ! for nA < nB. 
This implies that the probability of being the winner is greater for the 
technology with the larger number of innovators. 
For r = 1 we can use the results of Polya (1931) and Athreya (1969) 
to find that the limit of Xt has a Beta distribution with parameters nA and 
nB. We designate this limit random variable x. Then x has a density (with 
respect to the Lebesgue measure in Rl) of the following form 
This means that at the limit both of the technologies can exist in the 
market in all possible combinations. However, each individual combination 
has zero probability. We have for the following events non-zero probability 
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"the final combination belongs to the interval (il, (3)" , where (il, (3) ~ (0, 1) is 
arbitrary. The case r = 1 corresponds to the situation in which each imitator 
only has sufficient information about a single previous introduction of an 
alternative technology. This reflects a situation of extreme high uncertainty 
in the market. A negligible share only is known by the followers. According 
to the results of this model, one can expect here instability in the final 
sharing of the market by alternative technologies. 
To summarize the above argument we can make the following conclusion. 
When there is uncertainty about innovations, sharing the market depends 
on the strategies of the imitators (dependence of the final market share 
on the number r and numbers of innovators). In the case where followers 
make their choice according to the knowledge of their predecessors (if they 
know more than one case of previous innovation adoption) innovators can 
essentially affect the final sharing of the market. In particular the probability 
of dominating the market is greater for the technology with the larger number 
of innovators at the beginning of its life cycle. It is necessary also to mention 
that according to the premises and results of the model, innovators can 
only influence the market sharing tendency, but cannot predetermine (in a 
deterministic way) the domination of one of the alternative technologies. In 
addition, this model illustrates a very important regularity in the formation 
of new technological trajectories: the earlier phases of innovation diffusion 
playa relatively more important role in this process than later ones. As a 
result, the structure of the innovation diffusion process is formed in the very 
early stages. 
9.4 Diffusion of Innovations with Expected 
Profitability and Uncertainty of Current 
Market Sharing 
Now we shall consider the case in which the decisions of imitators are de-
termined by the expected probability of alternative technologies. We as-
sume that imitators have enough information about alternative innovations 
to estimate the expected dynamics of their relative profitabilities. This case 
corresponds to the diffusion of new technologies in stable environments in 
which the trajectories of evolution have already been formed and are stable. 
At the same time, as in the previous case, the main source of information for 
the followers of new technologies is the experience of earlier adopters. They 
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make decisions based on their estimation of the dynamics of innovation prof-
itability and the market situation. We assume that imitators interpret the 
apparent sharing of the market sample between alternative technologies as 
the sharing of the whole market. We must emphasize once more that accord-
ing to the premises of our approach, imitators make their decisions based 
on limited information about market structure - it is an important source 
of uncertainty in the decision making and in the randomness of innovation 
diffusion. 
As was mentioned above, the profitability of a new technology usually 
decreases with the increase in the number of adopters and later saturation of 
the market. Therefore it is natural to suppose that imitators will recognize 
the decreasing profitability of a technology as the number of its adopters 
increases. 
Let us introduce positive functions gA and gB which describe the depen-
dence of the proportions of the A and B technologies in the market sample 
and the imitators expected profitability. These principles of decision making 
can be formalized in the following way: 
Rule 2. Ask an odd number r of the previous adopters. Let N of them 
use technology A. (Consequently r - N use technology B.) Calculate the 
values gA( ~) and gB(l - ~). If the first of these values is greater, choose 
A. Otherwise choose B. 
According to the premise that a decrease in the proportion of a tech-
nology corresponds to an increase in the expected profitability, functions gA 
and gB should be nonincreasing. If they are decreasing there can be only 
one solution of the equation 
gA(X) = gB(X), x E [0,1]. (9.8) 
To ensure that the solution exists, one requires continuity of the func-
tions, and that gA([O,l]) = gB([O,l]) for example. (This last condition 
means that values of the expected profit abilities change in the same inter-
val.) Now we suppose that the solution of the equation (9.8) exists. Figure 
9.2 demonstrates one of the possible situations. 
Here x corresponds to the proportion of technology A in the market. 
Functions gA and 9A demonstrate two possible ways in which the expected 
profitability can decrease. One can see that if 9A(X) $ gA(X) for every x, 
then i* < X*. 
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Figure 9.2. Expected profit abilities of the technologies as functions of a 
proportion of technology A. 
Consider r > 1. Let N (r) be the smallest N such that N / r ~ x*. Then 
in the same manner as in the previous case, the probability of choosing 
technology A at time t is given by the formula 
N(r)-l Ci Cr - i L nA nB t t 
Cr i=O ni'+nfl 
and corresponding function p[I (x) equals pII (x) with the accuracy of the 
order 0(1) as t -t 00 (uniformly with respect to x E [0,1]). Here 
N(r)-l 
pII(x) = L C; xi(l- xy-i. 
i=O 
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Figure 9.3. Probability of choosing (according to Rule 2) technology A as 
a function of its proportion on the market. 
If r = 1 then p[I(x) = plI(x) = 1 - x for all t ~ 1. Function plI is given in 
Figure 9.3. 
The function f whose zeros determine all possible limit values for Xt 
(Arthur et al., 1987) is given by the following formula: 
f(x) = plI(x) - x. 
The corresponding set Bf ([0,1]) of zeros is singleton. As it follows from 
Arthur et al. (1987) Xt goes to () with probability 1 as t ~ 00. It is easy to 
see that () = ~ for r = 1 and for r > 1 there will be 
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(J>! when N(r) > ill 
(J = I when N(r) = r¥ 
(J <! when N(r) < ~. 
These results then have the following conceptual interpretation: 
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(1) When imitators make their decisions according to the expected proba-
bility dynamics, final sharing (namely, the position of the point (J) of 
the market by the new alternative technologies is determined by the 
strategies ofthe imitators. In contrast with the previous case, imitators' 
strategies influence the domination of one of the alternative technologies 
in the market in a deterministic way. 
(2) Under the given circumstances, both of the technologies will exist when 
the market reaches the limit. 
(3) For the given function of the reduction in the expected profitability for 
technology B (say 9B) and two given functions (say 9A and 9A) of the 
reduction in the expected profitability for technology A, the limit share 
of technology A will be smaller for the faster decreasing function (this 
means that 9A(X) ::; 9A(X) for all x E [0,1]). 
The results show that the final sharing of the market depends upon 
changes in the imitators' expectations of the profitability of new technolo-
gies. Fi9ures 9.2 and 9.3 illustrate the dependence between changes in the 
expectations of the imitators and shifts in the final structure of the market. 
The decrease in the rate of technology-expected profitability means that 
imitators estimate their chances of gaining profits by the introduction of 
technology A as greater than by the introduction of technology B. Therefore 
the changes in the expectations of imitators lead to a corresponding change 
in the limit structure of the market. Within this framework we can deal 
with a situation where one of the technologies (say B) is a conventional one. 
This means that 9B(X) = const for all x E [0,1]. 
To illustrate this let us consider the simplest examples. Assume that 
9A(X) = a+ b(l- X),9B(1- x) = c+ dx. Here 9A(0) = a + d is the expected 
profitability of technology A when nobody in the market sample uses it. 
Also 9(1) = a is the expected profitability of technology A when all adopters 
in the sample us it. Consequently a ~ 0, b ~ o. Similarly c ~ 0 and d ~ o. 
These functions are given in Figure 9.4. 
If a + b > c and d + b > 0 there is only one solution x* of the equation 
9A(X) = 9B(X). It is easy to check that 
* a+b-c 
x = d+b 
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Figure 9.4. Linear (with respect to the proportions on the market) expected 
profitabilities of the technologies. 
and x* belongs to (0,1) if and only if a + b > c and a < c + d. As one can 
see in Figures 9.2 and 9.3, if aj"!jjc > ! then technology A will dominate 
the market . 
Thus, under this dependence of the expected probability and share of 
alternative technologies, the final structure of the market is determined by 
both the initial and final expected profit abilities of the alternative technolo-
gies or by the relation between initial expected profit abilities and rates of 
change. In the case when 9A(0) = 9B(0), i.e., a + b = c + d, technology A 
will dominate in the market if, and only if, the rate at which its expected 
profitability will decrease is smaller (Le., b < d) . If the rates coincide (i.e. , 
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b = d) then x* = ~ + aibc = ~ + (a+b);(c+d). Consequently technology A will 
dominate in the market in this case if and only if its initial profitability is 
larger (i.e., a + b > c + d or a > c). 
9.5 Conclusions 
With the help of this model we can simulate the diffusion of alternative 
innovations under different assumptions about the influence of predecessors 
on the technological choice of followers so-called path-dependent processes 
of innovation diffusion. In this chapter we have considered the case of the 
diffusion of two new alternative technologies under different assumptions. It 
is not difficult to consider the general case with n alternative technologies. 
But some conceptual conclusions about the innovations diffusion can already 
be inferred from the results of this 2- technology model. 
The interesting results concern the role of innovators (entrepreneurs) and 
imitators in innovation diffusion at the stage when the market share is de-
cided. The model showed that imitators determine the trajectory of this 
process and the results of innovation competition. Entrepreneurs open up 
new technological possibilities, but their realization is determined by the im-
itators' choice of technologies. With uncertainty of technological choice, the 
probability of dominating the market is greater for the technology with the 
larger number of innovators. Of course, newcomers can change the situation. 
The result of technological competition is determined by the choice of all ac-
tors in the market. But the influence of earlier adopters on the formation of 
a technological trajectory is higher than those who adopt later. 
These results describe important features of the alternative innovation 
diffusion. Both in market and centrally planned economies it is difficult to 
estimate the relative advantages of alternative innovations in the early phase 
of their diffusion or in the periods of technological paradigm substitution. 
In this case followers make their choice according to information about pre-
decessor choices, and the trajectory of innovation diffusion is determined 
by the innovators. The technological trajectory is formed during the early 
phase of innovation diffusion. 
The role of innovators become less important when imitators have enough 
information to estimate the dynamics of the expected profitability of new 
technologies. In this case followers make their choice according to their own 
estimations of future profits. These expectations determine the trajectory of 
innovation diffusion and the final share of alternative technologies. With the 
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help of this approach one can simulate the formation of new technological 
trajectories under different types of imitator behavior. 
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